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Abstract
Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate
Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework.
We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can
decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any point in time. By means of
a simple analytical model and of a numerical integrated assessment model, we
assess different coalition structures, and different minimum admission
requirements. Our results indicate that a Partial Climate Agreement with open
entry can be effective, achieving climate stabilization between 2C and 3C
depending on the composition of the coalition of the willing. The policy turns out to
be also rather efficient, with only minor losses with respect to a full cooperation
agreement. Finally, we quantify the optimal admission requirement in about 4050% of cumulative abatement.
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1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyse the implications of a Partial Climate Agreement (PCA) with open entry
under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. By partial climate agreement with open entry we
mean an international climate policy in which a group of willing countries commit to emissions reductions
over time, and where the remaining countries can decide to join and leave the coalition at any point in time.
Participation in the agreement happens through carbon trading, and admission can be restricted by the
coalition of the willing by means of minimum targets of emissions reductions. We aim at understanding to
what extent such a PCA can yield emissions reductions which are effective and cost efficient, and to
ascertain the optimal admission requirements for non-signatory countries. This set up is motivated by the
recognition that even though full cooperation achieves optimality as measured both in terms of effectiveness
and efficiency, it is known to be very hard to sustain. The political capital supporting large international
climate agreements is low, despite the outcome of the Durban and Doha negotiation rounds. However, some
regions or countries continue to show a commitment to reducing their own emissions, most notably the EU,
Australia, some US states and maybe also the US as a whole if one is optimistic about the recent statements
of the just re-elected president Obama. The extension of the Kyoto protocol in Doha till 2020 ensures that
global carbon trading will avoid a sudden collapse, but is unlikely to significantly increase the prices of
certificates above their current historical lows due to oversupply and the recent economic downturn in
Europe. The future of a global emissions cap-and-trade system is at a crucial point in negotiation, and will
depend on what agreement will emerge from the Durban platform, which is ideally designed to involve all
the major players (and not just industrialized countries). A bottom up approach of pledge and review might
be the most likely outcome, but concerns about cost containment might eventually promote linkage of
different carbon markets (as already announced between Europe and Australia). In essence, a partial
agreement with some form of international linkage of carbon trading schemes might emerge as a possible
outcome in the future of international climate policy, as a compromise between inclusiveness and cost
control.
The problem of free riding and of carbon leakage represents the strongest argument against partial climate
agreements, since it leads to a relocation of GHG emissions from the group of countries advocating the deal
to the non-signatory regions. The idea of this paper is to shed light on the efficiency and effectiveness of a
partial agreement with open membership, in which a coalition of willing regions commit to emissions
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reductions, and the remaining countries can in any point in time decide whether to join or to leave the
coalition, a step intended to reduce cross-border carbon leakage. Our purpose is to detect to which extent an
allocation of carbon endowment for the non-signatory nations could provide an encouragement for coalition
undertaking that is more attractive than the incentive to free ride.
In such a context, we demonstrate that the regions outside the climate arrangement have a strong incentive in
joining the coalition if their commitment is lower than the pledge of the coalition. We also assess the role of
admission requirements, in the form of minimum emissions reductions targets, in terms of participation to
the PCA and to overall effectiveness in reducing global temperature increase. This policy scheme does not
tackle the fundamental problem of why a coalition of the willing should form and remain stable in the first
place. It embeds the assumption that some group of countries would commit to climate change mitigation
irrespective of what the others would do, a proposition which violates standard economic sense but which
can be actually observed in the behaviour of some regions. The main contribution of our work is to lay down
a simple model for thinking about the climate and economic consequences of a partial agreement, and to test
those using a numerical Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) with a game theoretic set-up which can
describe the reality of mitigation in a more accurate fashion.
In particular, this paper addresses the following research questions: are PCAs (Partial Climate Agreements)
with open entry more efficient compared to the case without open membership? If a PCA with open entry is
implemented, what loss of efficiency compared to an agreement with full (exogenous) participation will we
have? What are the optimal entry requirements? What climate target can be attained by such a policy
proposal?
The paper is organised as follow: section 2 describes the partial agreement policy and connects it to the
literature on climate coalitions, section 3 presents a simple analytical model and describes the
implementation WITCH integrated assessment model, section 4 illustrates the results and section 5
concludes.

2. Open Partial agreement and relation to the literature
A bargain for climate change which involves all the main GHG emitters will eventually be needed if we
strive to achieve climate stabilization at a safe level (Clarke et. al, 2009).
The main problem regarding optimal emission control strategies concerns the stability of the coalition, which
has been analysed in D’Aspremont et al (1983) by providing the definition of internally and externally stable
coalition. A coalition is internally stable if no region belonging to the coalition has the incentive to defect,
and therefore playing as singleton. It is externally stable if no region outside the coalition is better off to join
the coalition. Many authors have analysed the case of a grand coalition, pointing out that is not stable, as the
players have the incentive to free ride on that and so defect from the agreement: Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993), Eyckmans et al. (1993), Barrett (1994), Nordhaus and Yang (1996), Tol (1999), Bosetti et al (2009).

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 811 [2013]

When stable IEA (International Environmental Agreements) exist, they are endorsed by a limited number of
countries: Hoel (1991), Carraro and Siniscalco (1992), Tol (2001), Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera (2006).
Harstad (1997) has analysed the counterproductive role of side-payments in a bargaining context, and
Konrad and Thum (2011) have focused on the case of unilateral commitment in a context of asymmetric
information, arguing that pre-commitment reduces the potential gains from cooperation. By contrast, our
results show that side payments are able to entice non-signatory countries in the coalition and this can be
explained by the fact that these are not “take-it-or-leave-it” offers (chosen by the signatory agents to
maximise their expected payoff), but they emerge as an outcome of carbon market equilibrium.
Regarding the stability of the scenarios analysed in this paper – they are by definition externally stable since
non-signatories can freely join the agreement without the consent of signatories. This concept is also known
as ‘stability under open membership’ (Finus et al. 2005). However, we do not focus on the internal stability
since we are focusing on a policy in which signatories commit to emission reductions irrespective of the
consequences this would have on the climate. That is, the analysis is carried out in a cost effective mode in
which we do not consider the benefits associated with the avoided climate change impacts. We justify this
assumption by observing that in practice some regions and countries have already committed to individual
pledges of emissions reductions, either directly by means of emissions quotas or indirectly through
technology policies in favour of low carbon options. This behaviour reflects the high willingness to pay for
emissions reductions in some countries and especially by some constituencies, as well as the positive linkage
of mitigation policies to other policies of national interest, such as air pollution reduction, energy security,
innovation and competitiveness etc.
The literature has indeed provided some motivations about why a subset of countries should contribute with
a voluntary provision of public goods. In particular Hirshleifer (1983) has shown that if the global provision
of public goods is not given by the sum of the singe players, it can explain a large number of unselfish
behaviour. Carraro et al (2009 and 2011) suggest that in oligopolistic market a voluntary agreement belongs
to equilibrium only if a minimum participation rule is guaranteed. Owen (2008) has also showed that the
results in coalition formation games are highly dependent to the initial conditions, suggesting that even a
small change can lead to very different results. Sandler (1998) has focused on the facilitator and inhibitors of
collective actions at the worldwide level, suggesting that the way single player choose individual provision
levels, has a huge role to play for the possibility of a collective actions. Lee (2012) has provided a model in
which n players compete to win a specified social good prize and argued the existence of a unique stable
Nash-Equilibrium in which neither any player or group has the incentive to deviate from the equilibrium.
Despite some nations have already announced their plan to promote low carbon technologies and to contain
GHG emissions, many other countries have been reluctant to accept mitigation commitments with the fear
that those would undermine their economic growth. In such a context, the aim of our work is to focus on a
climate policy architecture capable of reconciling reluctant nations with the overall climate change objective.
As the problem of carbon leakage could jeopardize the effectiveness of a partial agreement, this policy
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scheme entails an accord with open membership which is meant to engage regions in the mitigation efforts
while at the same time relieve the welfare losses of the initial ratifiers. The openness of the agreement is
intended at cutting barriers between the signatory countries and the unwilling regions, by allowing for a
different carbon entitlement allocation which combines the interests of the willing nations and of the
remaining regions which are assumed to be more lenient as they could ill-afford the policy cost of a stringent
environmental settlement. Taking as given the commitment of the coalition of the willing, the advantages of
this scheme lie in the fact that signatory states have the possibility to settle on some unilateral mitigation
actions at an affordable cost without fretting on carbon leakage issues, and the developing regions could
benefit from carbon revenues. Under this framework, stand-alone policies might hold sway over the adverse
countries – as they are cajoled with the possibility of earnings from carbon revenues – by extending the
breadth of the coalition. In the model that will be presented in the next sections, the non-signatory regions
can endogenously decide whether to enter or not in the emission trading scheme and their choice will be
done on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. If the non-signatory countries agree to participate in, the entire
world can reap the benefit of a concerted action against global warming. If the adverse nations refuse to take
part of the treaty, the outcome will be the same as the case of a partial agreement with no open entry.
Regarding the engagement of the developing countries, Leimbach (2003) and Philiber (2000) have already
pointed out that many of them could benefit from joining an emission trading scheme. Buchholz et al. (2012)
has also investigated the consequences of partial cooperation between like-minded countries, but not the case
where only a subset of the players participates. Montero (1998) has focused on tradable permit system with
optimal opt-in using the EPPA model, suggesting that it might be optimal to set the opt-in allocation rule
above the expected baseline. Viguier (2004) has proposed a rent-sharing approach, which would guarantee
abatement efforts on a voluntary basis for some developing nations. In this paper we build-up on his hint
with a model that allows for endogenous participation to a climate agreement with open entry. An important
assumption of this scheme, as already noted, is that we take as given the commitment of a group of
committed countries. To assess a broad set of potential policies, we assess different sizes and composition of
this coalition of the willing. In all cases, we assume that the coalition of the willing (whatever that would be)
commits to emissions reductions which are consistent with a 450 ppm-e target on a global basis, in the case
of full participation. The 450 ppm-eq target is an important signpost for policy and science, since it is the
only climate target which is consistent with a reasonable probability to maintain global temperature increase
below 2C. According to the integrated assessment model used in this paper, attaining this global climate
target in an idealized setting of global cooperation entails emissions reductions in the order of 70% for the
world in 2050 with respect to 2005, and of about 90% for developed countries and 60% for developing ones.
These regional emissions commitments are roughly in line with the proposal of the major economies forum
meeting of 2009, and it is the one which we adopt for this paper for the coalition of the willing.
In such a context the determination of the admission requirements to the PCA is an important issue, in order
to set up an optimal carbon strategy. On one hand if the entrance requisites are too loose, the climate target
that would be achieved on a global level will not be significant. On the other hand, if the entry requirements
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are too ambitious, the non-signatory countries could resolve to opt out, and carry on with unrestricted
emissions, again leading to a warmer climate. This paper focuses on calculating the optimal admittance
requirements both analytically or numerically.
The identification of entry requirements embeds the financial flows which will be funnelled to the nonsignatory countries (tougher entry requirements imply additional financial transfers), that are also driven by
the relative marginal costs of abatement. In our framework we assume that the agents are not identical, as
they are characterized by different abatement cost function. Thereby, as already mentioned in Chander and
Tulkens (1994) the side-payments play a pivotal role if the climate proposal entails voluntary participation
(gamma core stability concept). Finus et al (2006) found that stable coalitions might emerge if the
environmental benefits are sufficiently high or if a proper transfer scheme is introduced. Carbone et al (2009)
established that emission trade can be effective even if countries are guided by their national self-interest.
Moreover they argued that when players choose emission permit non-cooperatively an extension of the
coalition might lead to higher global emission levels. Gersbach and Winkler (2011) have shown that a carbon
market with refunding leads to a Pareto-superior condition compared to a canonical international market of
permits and another paper (Gersbach et al. 2011) provides ways of raising initial fees.
In our model the participation of non-signatory countries reduces the level of domestic abatement required
for the initial ratifiers, and thus it can be recognised as a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) or Joint
Implementation (JI). We assume that such markets do not have transaction costs, and that they are perfectly
monitorable. This is a strong assumption, especially when compared to the actual experience of the CDM
markets, which has highlighted several deficiencies (Wara and Victor 2008). Nonetheless, this flexibility
mechanism has remained in place to date (and to 2020), and given its potential for cost containment is likely
to remain in some form or another also in the future. According to Michaleowa (2005) the CDM could
alleviate poverty in developing nations and that abatement initiatives should be ODA (Official Development
Assistance) financed. Financial flows from rich to poor nations arising from a carbon trading scheme,
according to Hof et al (2010), can also be viewed as compensation for climate change damages and
adaptation costs, since the developing regions are generally exposed more to global warming impacts.
In our paper we do not assume any sanctions or punitive measures for the non-signatory countries which
eventually will forsake the coalition. Regarding the effect of sanctions on coalition formation, on one hand
they have been shown to potentially have a significant influence on coalition undertaking (Lessmann et al.
(2009); on the other hand, Kemfert et al. (2004, 2005, 2006) has shown that trade restrictions not necessarily
are an incentive for non-cooperating countries to adhere to the coalition and that R&D spillovers can
promote participation.
Concerning the political feasibility of an environmental treaty, Bosetti and Frankel (2011) have provided a
framework for quantitative emission allocations. Flachsland et al. (2009) has analysed different typologies of
trading architectures classified in “top-down” approaches (driven by UNFCC) and “bottom-up” approaches
(driven by single countries), by showing a trade-off between political feasibility and climate effectiveness.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper811

6

Sferra and Tavoni: Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with

To avoid confusion, we would like also to shed light on the terminology used in this paper. We refer to
“signatory countries” as the initial ratifiers of the agreement which cannot bail-out the mitigation plan, and
that aim at cutting carbon emissions according to the carbon budget just described. We use the term “nonsignatory countries” for those regions (typically the emerging economies) which have not ratified the initial
agreement but which can join (or desert) the coalition in any point in time. It is important to note that we
refer to those regions as “non-signatory countries” even if and when they choose to enrol into the coalition.

3 Methodology
In this study we first sketch out a simple static model which we can be solved analytically and then move to
the implementation into an advanced intertemporal model which is solved numerically.

3.1 A Simple Analytical Static Model
We begin by sketching a simple static model which allows us to compute analytically the optimal entry
requirements for the non-signatories, for specific assumptions about the functional forms of the abatement
cost.
In this model we consider two agents: on one hand the subscriber agent (s) which cannot defect from the
agreement and on the other hand the non-signatory player (n) which can decide endogenously whether to
participate in or to stay outside of the treaty. For sake of simplicity we do not allow for negative GHG
emissions, so we constrain the amounts of relative abatement to be bound between zero and one.
The objective function (total costs to be minimised) for the signatory is as follows:

(
where

̅)

is the price of carbon permits,

1)
is the actual level of abatement accomplished,

̅ is the emission

target required by the climate agreement (in terms of percent of abatement compared to the BaU scenario),
is a non-negative region specific parameter of the Cost of Abatement and

is the exponent (we assume

>0). The use of a power law formulation for the abatement cost functions is supported by the literature
which calibrates marginal abatement schedules, and also from what is generated from the WITCH integrated
assessment model as shown later in the paper. The aim of the signatory player is to minimize total costs
under a climate policy agreement, given by the net import of permits
Abatement

(

̅) plus the Cost of

. In this version of the model we do not consider investments (since it is a static model) and

we simply assume a cost minimization game considering a marginal cost of abatement (MAC) and the
gains/losses from carbon trade activity.
Equation 2 provides the objective function to be minimized by the non-signatory agent:

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

7

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 811 [2013]

[

(

̃)]

2)

The only difference compared to equation 1 is that the contribution of carbon trade activity to the total cost
can only be negative (we use a min function), as the agent can decide freely to join the climate accord. In
such a context, we define

̃

as the entry requirement for the non-signatory agent, in term of minimum

percent of abatement compared to the BaU.
If the non-signatory agent decides to not participate, his optimal abatement is equal to zero, and trade of
permits does not take place as the signatory player will accomplish his carbon target only through domestic

̅.

abatement:

If the non-signatory player does participate, carbon trade emerges and consequently

also financial transfers between the two agents. In this case the price of permit in equilibrium can be
determined by imposing the market clearing condition:

̃

̅

3)

We can easily compute the First Order Condition (FOC) of the two agents to determine the optimal level of
abatement for the two agents, as well as the carbon price, as:

Solutions (FOC)

Participation case:
(

=

(

(

̃)

(

)

(

)
(̃

⁄(

Non-Participation case:

⁄(

)

⁄(

)

̅

̅)
)

̃)

⁄(

)

)

–

Table 1: Solutions – First Order Condition (FOC)

It is also trivial to show that the solution we get when the non-signatory agent agrees to participate is more
efficient compared to the case of a unilateral effort, as the same climate target can be achieved with a lower
marginal cost of abatement
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. (̃

(̃

̅)
(

̅)

4)

)

Expression 4 demonstrates that a partial climate agreement with open entry is a dominant strategy compared
with the case without open entry, as it is able to alleviate the policy cost of the signatory player given the
same global climate target (if both

and

are greater than zero).

The model also allows us to ascertain the optimal access requirement set by the signatory countries for the
non-signatory one. We define the “optimal entry requirement” from the perspective of the coalition of the
willing as the minimum emission reduction target required to be admitted to the climate agreement and
which ensures the maximum abatement of the non-signatory player. As the reluctant player will participate
only if the revenues from carbon trade activity exceed the cost of abatement, the optimal admittance
requirements needs to satisfy the solving equation 5:

(

̃)

5)

By substituting
with , and then
with
, we can calculate the admission conditions in equation 6
(we have omitted other solutions implying negative entry requirements):

̃

(
(

) ̅

6)

)

If the aim of the signatory player is to maximize the amount of abatement of the demurring agent (and thus
abatement at the worldwide level) the equality holds in equation 6.
The formula reveals that the optimal admittance requisite is a fixed ratio of the commitment of the signatory,
which depends on the abatement cost functions in the two regions. Figure 1 plots the behavior of ̃
function of h and
signatories (

̅ as a

. In line with intuition, it shows that a lower cost ratio between non-signatories and
)1 implies a higher entry requirement, given that the trading system equalizes marginal

abatement costs between the two agents. Interestingly, if this ratio is sufficiently small (below 10%), the
optimal admission requirement for the non-signatory player could be more stringent than the commitment of
the subscriber agent. Similary, an increase in (h) – which implies a reduction of the marginal cost of
abatement for both agents2 – increases the the optimal entry requirement with respect to the target of the
signatory player, with equalization of the two at the limit:

̃
̅

if

.

1

represents the ratio of total as well as marginal abatement costs for the same level of abatement in the two
regions.
2
We assume that the amount of abatement (x) is constrained between 0 and 1. Thus an increase in h implies a lower
marginal cost of abatement.
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Figure 1: Contour plot of ̃

̅ as a function of h (x axis) and

(y axis).

Ultimately, the optimal entry requirement will depend on the calibration of the abatement cost function for
the two regions. If we assume quadratic marginal costs (e.g. h=3) and symmetric countries (e.g.

), the

optimal entry requirement for non-signatories will be exactly half of the commitment of the signatories (e.g.
̃
̅

). If the non-signatories have lower abatement costs, as sometimes assumed to be the case in

developing economies which have more room for efficiency improvements, with marginal costs 50% lower,
then the ratio between the optimal entry and the signatory commitment would be roughly 65%. We will
come back to this simple model after the discussion of the numerical integrated assessment model results,
calibrating the parameters to the MAC which are generated by the WITCH model.
This model is very simplified, in that it assumes a static setting, specific functional forms for abatement
costs, and a two region setting. In the next section we generalize this approach and explain how we have
incorporated the partial cooperation agreement into a more sophisticated and realistic dynamic setting .

3.2. Implementation in the WITCH model
The WITCH model (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid Model)3 is an integrated assessment model
developed at FEEM with the aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of international climate change
policies in terms of optimal mitigation strategies under different policy instruments. The Model is made up
of 13 macro-economic regions. It is hybrid since it combines a top-down description of the economic sector
3

For a full description of the model please refer to Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) and Bosetti et al (2009). The
website www.witchmodel.org contains useful information on the model.

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper811

10

Sferra and Tavoni: Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with

(which is described by a Ramsey-type optimal growth model) and a compact representation of the mitigation
options in the energy and land use sectors.
The WITCH model can be run both using a cooperative solution (which internalises all the externalities) or a
non-cooperative (decentralised) solution. All the results presented in this paper have been run using a noncooperative framework, and therefore each region is playing strategically as a response of the other regions’
best responses.
When choosing optimal investment paths over the century, each region is forward looking and maximise its
social welfare (defined as the logarithm of discounted consumption per capita) given the choice of the other
players. As a result the outcome of the model is an Open Loop Nash Equilibrium that takes into account the
role of multiple externalities. An interesting feature of the WITCH model is the endogenous technical change
and the prominent role of technological spillovers among countries, including both investments in R&D and
learning by doing effect. Other externalities comprise, fuel prices and GHG releases, emission permit trading
and energy resources use. This version of the model also allows for trade of oil (Massetti and Sferra 2010)
and entails dedicated investments in the oil extraction sector.
When a climate policy scenario is run, a carbon trading system allows for transfer of carbon credits across
regions, in any time period. The price of permits emerges as an outcome of a Nash Equilibrium, and it is
adjusted iteratively according to a Walrasian-Tatônnement process, to yield equilibrium between supply and
demand. The time horizon of the model is 2005-2100 using a five-year time step, which makes it well suited
to address long-term climate policies.
In this paper we have enhanced the WITCH model by introducing the endogenous participation feature.
All the equations regarding the implementation into the WITCH model are reported in Appendix 1. Yet, the
equations are different as we distinguish between signatory and non-signatory regions. Basically the
signatory countries have an upper bound on carbon emissions (equation A1) which is consistent with a 450
ppm target at the global level (the regional target convergences to an equal per capita scheme in 2050,
according to a full participation backdrop at a global level). Then all the regions have full intertemporal
flexibility through banking and borrowing. Therefore in each point in time (since the climate accord starts)
each region can choose to bank emission permits to the future or to make early use of carbon allowances in
case of borrowing. Through banking and borrowing, we intend to allow for the maximum flexibility as
possible in the market. Hence, we do also consent to save the carbon permits purchased on the market, and to
eventually sell it in the future. Nevertheless, in order to prevent an excess of speculation activities – and then
problems in clearing the carbon market – we disqualify the agents from importing more permits compared to
their actual needs (cumulative carbon budget) throughout the century (equation A3). In fact, if a region
imports more carbon credits than its actual needs (difference between cumulative emissions and its carbon
budget) it is only for a pure speculation purpose, inspired by the expectation of selling permits at a higher
price. However we it is important to remark that we this condition is not binding if the cumulative amount of
net imported permits throughout the century is negative (or in other words if the agent is a net seller of
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permits), which can be seen as an incentive for the exporting regions, as they bear the brunt of the
stabilisation efforts.
In our scheme we do assume that the commitment e required to join the coalition for the averse nations will
gradually tighten over time, starting from a 0% abatement required when the climate accord starts (2015 in
our model), and which will linearly increase up to E% in 2100. The reason why the carbon burden is loose
in the early periods is to entice the unwilling countries in the treaty. Then, prompt investments in low carbon
technologies and energy R&D are likely to trigger the virtuous processes of learning by doing and learning
by researching, by making less tempting a breach of the agreement. In the next sections we analyse how a
change in the admission requirement E will influence the participation choice of the outsider players.
Basically, the demurring nations can take advantage from carbon rents only if they are reducing GHG by at
least e% compared to the BaU scenario, so that any additional amount of abatement can be traded in the
carbon market (equation A4). Carbon revenues embody the worth of coalitions for the reluctant countries; in
fact we do not consider the damage function, so we are assuming that global warming has no impact on GDP
growth.
An interesting feature of our model is that also the non-signatory regions have full intertemporal flexibility
through banking and borrowing condition (equation A5) and they can either short sell or hoard carbon credit
offsets (and postpone sales when the carbon price is higher). This assumption is quite important since the
developing countries are eager to raise funds today, even if that would imply a lower consumption tomorrow
as a result of mitigation efforts. Conceivably, the magnitude of this intertemporal effect hinges on the
parameterization of objective function, in particular regarding the pure rate of time preference and the
elasticity of marginal utility of consumption (see Anthoff et al. 2009 and Dasgupta 2008 for further
reference).However some carbon trade limitations should be enshrined in a proper environmental treaty.
Conceivably, the regions which are participating in the carbon market, would not accept the intervention of
the adverse regions inspired only by speculation purposes without undertaking any abatement action.
Consequently we impose two further restrictions 1) the non-signatory regions are eligible to buy permits only
if they are actually containing the emissions compared their target, in order to rule out from the trading
scheme the countries that are not committed to GHG stabilisation efforts and 2) the maximum amount of
imported permits should be proportional to the amount of tradable emission permits. Both of above
conditions are imposed by equation A6.
It should be also kept in mind that it is possible to join and quit the mitigation treaty multiple times.
Therefore we assume that if the non-signatory countries stumble out the mitigation pact and then decide to
embark the climate resolution in a further time period, they cannot eventually use erstwhile carbon credits
accrued from a previous participation (equation A7).
When running the WITCH model, we assume that the subscriber countries commit to curtail GHG
emissions, according to a path that is consistent with a 450 ppm-e scenario at the international level using a
cap and trade framework, which starts in 2015. The players outside the partial environmental arrangement
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have no constrains on GHG releases, but they can join it – and exchange permits on the carbon market– if
they comply to at least a e% of abatement compared to the Business as Usual scenario (BaU); so that any
additional amount of GHG abatement can be traded in the carbon market. Of course, this might imply a
pouring of money from the signatory to non-signatory countries.
We have run a number of simulations by changing the value of E (commitment for the non-signatory nations,
as a percent of abatement in 2100) to appraise their response in terms of endogenous participation choice.
Hence the outcome of the model is a OPANE – Open Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium – with
endogenous participation and the results will be presented in the next section.
We would like also to mention some limitations of our set up. The main caveat of our work is that we are
assuming that all the regions are price taker, so that they cannot modify the carbon price by curbing carbon
trade. Into the bargain we are not considering many co-benefits linked with GHG mitigation. In particular we
are excluding from our analysis the climate change impacts on the economic activity (the damage function
that links GHG impacts to the economic activity has been switched off). Other ancillary benefits that are not
taken into account in our model are: human health improvements, biodiversity, energy security and other
(avoided) cost of adaptation to global warming.
Finally, we assume that the non-signatory countries will adopt individually best-reply strategies as they will
play as singletons.

4. Results
In this section we provide the results obtained from the Integrated Assessment Model WITCH. Then we
compare the admission requirements assessed numerically by the WITCH model with the admission
requirements computed analytically with the static model.

4.1 Results from the WITCH Model
In numerical simulations of the WITCH model we consider several structures of the partial climate
agreement, by varying two dimensions: the first dimension refers to the composition of the coalition of the
willing, and the second dimension refers to the entry requirements (E) required to join the coalition for the
non-signatories.
By varying the first dimension we are able to recognise how the size of the signatory regions will influence
the investments decision in the rest of the world. We analyse four different situations by varying the number
of countries enlisted among the signatory: EU, OECD, OECD+CHINA,and MEF4 (Major Economies Forum

4

This scenario involves all the states partners of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) launched
in March 2009. Further information is available at the following website: http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2013

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 811 [2013]

on Energy and Climate) scenario which includes all the economic aggregates except Middle East and North
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
The second dimension – admission conditions (E) – allows us to analyse the optimal reaction of the nonratifiers in terms of endogenous participation to the carbon trading scheme. As a result, it is possible to
identify an efficient frontier for admission requirements which is aimed at minimising the policy cost of the
coalition of the willing compared to the climate goal. In our simulations we consider nine increasing steps
ranging from 10% to 90% of abatement required in 2100, to be achieved with a linear schedule starting from
0% in 2015. The next table summarises the main results obtained from the WITCH model for the 4 coalitions
of the willing and the nine admission requirements for the non-signatories:
Entry requirements (E ): Percent of Abatement in 2100 | non signatory countries
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%

No Open
Entry

Temperature above pre-industrial levels in 2100
[Degree Celsius]
EU
OECD
OECD + CHINA
MEF

4.3
3.6
3.0
2.2

4.3
3.5
2.9
2.1

4.2
3.3
2.8
2.1

4.1
3.2
2.7
2.0

4.0
3.0
2.6
2.0

3.9
2.8
2.4
1.9

4.0
2.7
2.3
1.9

3.7
2.7
2.3
2.0

3.9
3.0
2.5
2.0

4.4
3.8
3.2
2.2

Average Transfer of Money on yearly basis from sign. to non-sign. countries [Billion USD]
EU
OECD
OECD + CHINA
MEF

1
25
240
728

3
33
273
613

4
44
341
969

5
57
414
1,050

8
69
500
1,144

9
89
608
1,210

16
108
722
1,423

18
133
1,056
1,585

21
135
1,486
1,684

0
0
0
0

0.02%
0.15%
0.79%
1.94%

0.04%
0.20%
0.90%
1.88%

0.06%
0.27%
1.07%
1.96%

0.07%
0.35%
1.25%
2.03%

0.13%
0.42%
1.42%
2.05%

0.15%
0.55%
1.65%
2.03%

0.26%
0.67%
1.88%
2.07%

0.29%
0.82%
2.41%
1.80%

0.34%
0.95%
3.09%
1.68%

0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%

EU
OECD
OECD + CHINA
MEF

-524
-1,731
-1,956
-876

-618
-1,994
-2,070
-887

-700
-2,247
-2,183
-899

-849
-2,458
-2,299
-914

-1,114
-2,757
-2,400
-900

-1,368
-3,037
-2,481
-895

-1,179
-3,213
-2,559
-902

-1,672
-2,923
-2,523
-683

-1,364
-2,181
-1,961
-519

79
70
272
147

Ratio of Abatement: non-signatory vs signatory
countries
EU
OECD
OECD + CHINA
MEF

41.31
8.76
1.53
0.21

30.59
7.79
1.47
0.21

26.60
6.92
1.43
0.21

30.13
5.98
1.39
0.21

25.29
5.64
1.34
0.20

26.05
5.13
1.26
0.20

12.77
4.54
1.23
0.19

17.07
3.24
1.11
0.14

11.64
2.06
0.81
0.11

-0.21
-0.04
-0.09
-0.03

Discounted GDP losses for signatory countries
EU
OECD
OECD + CHINA
MEF

-0.10%
0.08%
0.79%
2.91%

-0.07%
0.14%
0.93%
3.00%

-0.06%
0.22%
1.12%
3.14%

-0.05%
0.33%
1.33%
3.31%

-0.01%
0.42%
1.51%
3.50%

0.02%
0.59%
1.81%
3.71%

0.17%
0.78%
2.07%
3.86%

0.20%
1.10%
2.51%
3.96%

0.26%
1.42%
3.12%
4.09%

2.70%
3.16%
6.77%
4.40%

Cumulative Transfer of Money as a Share of
Cumulative GDP (Discounted at 5%)
EU
OECD
OECD + CHINA
MEF
Cumulative Carbon leakage - Non signatory
countries [Gt CO2]

Table 2 Endogenous Participation to a Partial Climate Agreement: Main Numerical Results

Table1 provides information on the main variable of interest, namely temperature, financial transfers (or
side-payments), carbon leakage, ratio of abatement (signatory vs. non-signatory), and discounted policy cost
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for the endorser countries. In the last column on the right we also display the results obtained with a partial
climate accord without open entry, in order to appreciate the differences stimulated by the open membership
of the treaty.
If we look at the global temperature increase in 2100 one can note that a partial climate agreement with open
membership is capable of a lower temperature target compared to the case with no open entry. This
improvement hinges on the abatement made on a voluntary basis by the non-signatory nations which
endogenously choose to enrol the coalition and take advantage of carbon rents. Thus, an environmental
bargain with open entry entails a reduction in emissions of the non-signatories, in contrast with the carbon
leakage which would occur in the no open entry case. This result holds for all the considered coalitions of
willing.
The mitigation made possible with the enlargement of the coalition, implies a side-payment from signatory
to non-signatory nations, which might raise concerns about the political feasibility of such an agreement. If
we look at the case where the subscriber states encompass the OECD, we can notice that average annual
financial flows (during the period 2005 – 2100) range from 25 to 135 Billion $\year5. In particular a climate
target of 2.7º C can be achieved with an average transfer of money of 108 Billion $\year. With the purpose
of detecting whether this amount is politically sustainable, we can compare it with the historical transfer of
money to developing countries for official development assistance. According to a paper published by the
United Nations6, the year which recorded the maximum amount of transfer flows from rich to poor nations
was 2010, when they amounted to 129 Billion USD. Therefore, according to our simulations, the same level
of transfer would allow the OECD to induce sufficient cooperation to achieve a temperature target in 2100 of
2.7º Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This should be compared to a global temperature target of 3.8º
Celsius for the same group of signatories but without the open entry mechanism, a policy which moreover
would cost about 3 times the one with open entry. On the other hand, these side-payments would
significantly increase when the coalition of the willing enlarges and achieves more stringent climate
objectives, in which case they can exceed 1 Trillion per year (not discounted). It is also interesting to note
that whilst global temperature shows a U shaped pattern as the admission requirements get stringent, the
average transfer of money tends always to increase (with the only exception of the MEF scenarios, especially
when E>70%). This is motivated by the fact that non-signatory countries undertake always a certain degree
participation in the agreement, though for a shorter time span. Even in case of stricter entry requirements, the
amount of mitigation required in the early period is relatively small and this allow them to sell carbon credits
at a high price of carbon (which anticipates the expectation of a future relinquishment of the non-signatory
countries).
It would be also useful to compare the side-payments from signatory countries as a share of their GDP. To
this end we have reported in table 2 the amount of cumulative transfer of money as a share of cumulative
GDP (both discounted at a 5% rate). We can notice that an extension of the coalition of the willing leads
5
6

Constant 2005 USD.
Source: “World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012”. United Nations
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always to an increase in the share. If we focus on the OECD case we can also observe that this share reaches
0.67% in the case of E=70%. It is interesting to note that this value is in line with the ODA (Official
Development Assistace) goal, which aim is to set a 0.7% of transfer from the OECD countries to the
developing countries, in order to help them to achieve the MDGs (Millennium Development Goals). Other
variable of interests are the amount of abatement carried out by the signatory regions compared to the
abatement (or negative carbon leakage) taking place in the non-signatory states. We can notice that the level
of abatement achieved by the non-signatory nations is usually higher than that of the signatories, particularly
if the size of the signatory regions is small. In fact if only the European Countries are signatory, the
abatement initiatives will be accomplished mostly in the developing countries, as a result of carbon trade
activity. It is interesting to note that the money transfers (carbon trade expenditures) from the European to
non-signatory countries are comparable with the oil rebate expenditures (Figure 2).
GDP Gains / Losses Decomposition - Signatory countries: EU
5% Discounted - Billion USD

1500
1000
500
0
-500
-1000
Oil Expenditures
-1500

Carbon Trade Expenditures

-2000

Other gains / losses

-2500
10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Entry requirements

Figure 2 GDP Gains / Losses Decomposition: EU Scenario

Our numerical simulation also allows us to establish a clear relationship between the size of the coalition of
the willing, the admission requirements and the optimal strategic response of the opposed regions in terms of
GHG emissions.
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Figure 3 Optimal Reaction function for the various PCAs simulated.

Figure 3 reports the results. The Y axis measures the size of the signatories, in terms of cumulative emission
from 2005 to 2100 (or, in other words, the Carbon Budget), and the horizontal axis represents the optimal
response – in terms of GHG releases – of the laggard states, for different targets of admission requirements.
The lines show the associated level of the global temperature increase (degree Celsius above pre-industrial
level)7. The graph identifies a U-shaped relationship:as the admission requirement (E) gets stricter, global
GHG emissions (and the resulting temperature increase) decrease, till an admission requirement threshold is
reached (usually corresponding to E=70-80%). For stricter entry requirements, some players do not
participate to the agreement, and the effectiveness of the partial climate agreements drops. The chart
indicates that if the entry requirement is chosen optimally, global temperature can be kept below 2, 2.3 and
2.7 degree C for coalitions of the willing of MEF, OECD+China and OECD respectively.
Moving from effectiveness to efficiency, in Figure 4 we draw a relationship between the policy cost of the
signatory countries and the temperature target achieved in 2100, so as to establish an efficient frontier for
admission requisites.

7

We assume that global temperature increase is linearly related to global cumulative emissions, in line with the carbon
budget approach according to which each 1000GtCO2 generates about 0.45 of equilibrium temperature increase
(Matthews et. al 2012).
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No Open Entry

Figure 4 Efficient Frontier

The vertical axis represents the policy cost (5% discounted GDP losses) for the signatory regions, and the
horizontal axis reports the climate target (in terms of temperature above pre-industrial levels) in 2100. We
report all the PCAs scenarios, as well as the case of partial climate agreement without open entry and the
first best case of full cooperation. Two main results emerge from the graph. First, as already noted and as
expected, the open entry option allows achieving substantial efficiency gains. Second, and most importantly,
the PCAs attains efficiency very close to that of the benchmark full participation case, especially if the
admission requirement is chosen optimally and the climate objective is not too stringent. This is an important
result, and is due to the ability of the PCAs to induce a relatively high level of cooperation, as will be shown
below8. The high efficiency performance of the PCAs is also due to the fact that the WITCH model features
multiple externalities, and that as a result a second best policy framework can not be necessarily welfare
decreasing, in so far the innovation market externality is internalized. See DeCian and Tavoni (2012) for an
application to the carbon market.
Finally we analyse the temporal and regional rates of the endogenous participation choice in order to identify
“when” and “which” of the non-signatory nations decide to undertake the climate accord or to walk away
from it. Figure 5 reveals the timeline of the participation choice for each region and in each period for all of
the 36 PCA scenarios analysed in this paper:

8

Some discrepancies might be also due to the different timing of the policy cost paths, which are here collapsed in NPV
terms at 5% discounting. The results are confirmed even when measuring policy costs as consumption losses.
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EU

2005

OECD

2100

2005

2100

OECD+CHINA

2005

2100

MEF

2005

2100

Entry requirements:
E =10%

E =40%

E =70%

E =20%

E =50%

E =80%

E =30%

E =60%

E =90%

Figure 5 Timing and composition of the participation in the partial cooperation agreement

Figure 5 displays four panels with the four cases analysed in this study (EU, OECD, OECD+CHINA and
MEF). Each row represents a different admission requirement for each region (darkest colours indicate
tougher entry requirements, E), and the horizontal axis reports the time periods (from 2005 to 2100). The
coloured areas indicate that the region is undertaking the climate policy initiative, in that period. As the
policy agreement starts in 2015, the first two periods (2005 and 2010) are always depicted in white. Finally,
the signatory countries are portrayed with a grey area, as they are obliged to a wholehearted adoption of the
environmental accord.
If we look at the “EU” only coalition of the willing, we can notice that the engagement of the non-signatory
regions tend to occur mostly in the early periods (when the amount of abatement required is particularly
loose9) and then in the second half of the century, when the low carbon technologies and energy-efficient
technologies become competitive due to the rising costs of fossil fuel energy, and also because of the
9

As a reminder, the admission requirement linearly ramps up from 0% in 2015 to E% in 2100.
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learning processes due to the innovation and adoption processes carried out mainly by the signatory nations
(in this case Europe, which has lowered the price of backstop to around 40-50$\Mwh in 2100). Interestingly,
there are two main forces (interrelated to each other) that drive the participation choice of the adverse
countries: the availability of the low carbon technologies and the admission requisites. On one hand higher
admission requirements underpins the amount of domestic GHG reduction undertaken by the initial
subscriber of the treaty, which has positive fallout on the development of low carbon technologies (by means
of learning by doing and learning by researching). Then the expectation of a full deployment of low carbon
technologies makes more attractive a late participation in the agreement for the non-signatory countries, as
they wait until the low-carbon technologies will be available at an affordable price. On the other hand as the
entry conditions (E) are getting stricter, non-signatories tend to anticipate their involvement to the climate
agreement, to take advantage of the earlier periods in which the entry requirement is still low. The first effect
tends to prevail when the admission requirements are low (ranging from 10% - 30%), then when they are
getting stricter (from 40-90%) the second effect triumph. This pattern is particularly clear in CHINA,
KOSAU (South Korea, South Africa and Australia), TE (Transition Economies, mainly formed by Former
Soviet Union regions) and EEURO (Eastern European countries).
Another clear message that the graph reveals is that the major oil exporting regions – MENA (Middle East
and North African regions) in particular – are the most reluctant states in participating to the PCA (especially
if the size of the initial coalition is small) since their decision is affected by oil demand dynamics at the
international level, and the extent to which the energy terms of trade effects can be compensated by the
revenues from the carbon market. MENA has to decide whether to continue to produce oil (both for domestic
consumption and oil exports) or to enforce the mitigation plan that requires a relocation of oil investments
towards low carbon technologies. This second case is justified only when the prices of carbon permits rise
sufficiently and when oil demand drops sufficiently, e.g. when a large coalition exists and a low temperature
target is attained. This is for example the case of a “OECD’ coalition of the willing, in which case MENA
participates more actively in the climate agreement.
Apart from MENA, the “OECD” scenarios are also able to entice large GHG emitters such as CHINA, and
INDIA. It is also interesting to note that the aggregate TE and EASIA (Eastern Asian nations) are willing to
participate in almost all the OECD scenarios. The case “OECD+CHINA” confirms that EASIA and TE are
virtually always in the treaty and also INDIA and LACA (Latin and Central American states) appear to be
keen in participating.

4.2 Comparison with the static model
In the previous sections we have analysed the results obtained from the WITCH model. An interesting result
is that the optimal entry requirements (E*max) is robustly found to be in the range of 70-80% which
corresponds to a 42-50% of cumulated abatement. We can compare this result with those of the simple static
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model which allows us computing the admission requirements analytically. In order to make these
calculations, the analytical model requires an estimation of the abatement cost parameters

,

and .

To this end we have run a number of carbon tax scenarios to estimate the marginal abatement costs of the
WITCH model. We have estimated those parameters using both a simple OLS (Ordinary Least Square) and
SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) system. All the parameters are statistically significant at the 1%
level, and additional information is provided in appendix 2.
We have fed those parameters into the analytical model to compute analytically the optimal entry
requirements, which are reported in Table 3, alongside with the estimates of the abatement costs parameters
for the four coalitions of the willing considered in the scenario analysis.

EU

OECD

OECD+CHINA

MEF

81%
80%

86%
70%

86%
80%

83%
70%

47%

42%

50%

43%

19%

38%

40%

38%

193
69924
2.95

344
3330
3.07

796
960
3.15

7697
271
3.06

9%

32%

43%

46%

178
42964
2.82

292
2304
2.89

1028
1263
3.35

8490
280
3.10

8%

30%

45%

46%

Results from WITCH

̅
E*

̃

̃

OLS estimation
Cn
Cs
H
Results from the analytical model
using OLS estimation:

̃
SUR estimation
Cn
Cs
H
Results from the analytical model
using SUR estimations

̃

Table 3 Entry requirements computed analytically (static model) and numerically (WITCH model).

The first part of the table summarises the result obtained from the WITCH model, in particular regarding the
cumulative target – in terms of per cent of abatement – of the signatory countries

̅

and the optimal entry

conditions for the non-signatory agent (regional percent of abatement required to participate). Since E*
corresponds to the percent of abatement required to participate in 2100, we have also computed the
corresponding level of per cent of abatement required during the period 2005-2100 ( ̃
should be noted that ( ̃

). However it

) does not exactly coincide with the actual level of abatement of non signatories.

In fact in WITCH these nations can freely decide to withdraw from the coalition at any point in time. As a
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result many of them do not participate for the entire period (2015-2100), as shown in Figure 5. Hence we
have computed another parameter which considers only the actual level of abatement accepted by the
opposed regions in the WITCH model: ̃

10.

Table 4 shows a relatively good agreement between the static and the numerical model regarding the entry
requirement, with an abatement goal in the range of 40-50% (in cumulative terms) as being the optimal one.
Some variations can nonetheless be observed, given the different nature of the two models. If the coalition of
the willing is small (EU and OECD case) the admittance requirements computed analytically ̃

are

lower than the numerical (WITCH) estimations. On the other hand as the size of the signatory countries
tends to increase, the WITCH model envisages lower admission requirements compared to that computed
analytically (either using OLS or SUR estimates).

5. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the efficiency and effectiveness of a PCA with open entry, using a game
theory approach. The novel feature of our study is the endogenous participation choice to a partial climate
accord, which can in any point in time decide to sign up or to exit the coalition, as well the methodology,
which employs a simple static model in conjunction with a fully-fledged integrated assessment numerical
model.
We provide positive evidence of the implications of a partial climate bargain with open membership. First, it
is more efficient in tackling the problem of global warming, compared to the case with no-open membership.
A partial climate resolution with open entry is able to overcome the problem of carbon leakage: the
possibility of joining the agreement, translates the climate change problem into an economic opportunity for
the non-signatory countries, as they can take advantage of a lower commitment by exporting carbon credits
with a low associated cost of abatement, which also reduces the policy cost of the initial ratifiers under the
hypothesis of perfect competition in the markets. The open membership of the deal manages to largely avoid
carbon leakage and to significantly climate effective at the global level. In fact if we consider the case of a
coalition of the willing formed by the OECD, an environmental treaty with (without) open entry is able to
achieve a climate target of 2.7º (3.8º) in 2100 with an associated policy cost of 0.78% (3.16%) for the
underwriter regions. If along with the OECD countries we adjoin China, a target of 2.3º (3.2º) could be
attained in 2100, with a policy cost of 2.07% (6.77%) for the signatory nations.
The choice of an admission requirement in the form of a minimum target for abatement has been shown to be
an important driver of the effectiveness of the partial climate agreement. We have provided evidence of a U
shaped relation between the stringency of the admission requirement and the global effectiveness of the
PCAs, with an optimal entry level of about 70-80% of emissions reductions in 2100, or equivalently of 4010

If a region withdraws from the agreement in a certain year we consider the actual level of emission as carbon target
in order to compute ̃
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50% in cumulative terms. These results are quite robust across different sizes of the coalition of the willing,
and hold both in the static analytical and inter-temporal numerical models.
We have also presented an efficient frontier for the identification of the cost effectiveness of the PCA
scheme. Our numerical results indicate that a partial climate agreement would fare quite well, with only
minor losses with respect to the full cooperation case for most of the scenarios analysed.
The application of a partial accord with open entry might raise some concerns about the required financial
flows from signatory to non-signatory countries. If we consider the case of the OECD, the transfer of money
to the rest of the world is comparable to the existing ODA (Official Development Assistance) program. The
Green Climate Fund drafted in the last Climate Change Summit at the end of 2011 (Durban Climate Change
Conference), was aimed at providing 100 Billion USD at year from rich to poor regions, and this amount of
financial flow is in line with the side-payments required by our proposal (from OECD to the rest of the
world), ranging from 25 to135 Billion USD at an yearly basis, which would attain a target of 2.7º at the
global level. However it is important to remark that in our simulation, the volume of transactions in the
emission trading scheme – and then the transfer of money – is not uniform across the whole time horizon, as
it is considerably higher in the early periods. Another way to assess the political feasibility of these scenario
is to compute the ratio of financial transfer compared to the GDP of the signatory countries which in the
OECD scenarios varies from 0.15 to 82%% of cumulative GDP (discounted at 5%). Again, this range is in
line with the ODA goal, which aim is to provide 0.7% of national income from the OECD to the developing
countries.
Another key message is the ability of stand-alone policies to shift world energy market dynamics. In such a
context we have analysed the case in which the European States alone (EU scenarios) will commit
themselves to a stringent emission reduction target (which is roughly in line with the EU Roadmap 2050),
with open entry. Our simulations show that the European countries have the financial clout to enhance the
worldwide temperature by 0.9º Celsius in 2100 (3.7º against 4.6º in the BaU scenario). Therefore also
unilateral policies – under a cap and trade scheme with open membership – can strikingly influence the
global temperature by inducing broad-based participation worldwide, due to the role played by carbon
finance.
On top of that, the worth of coalition for the non-signatory countries stems from carbon revenues arising
from carbon trading activity. Then, all the simulations with open membership presented in this paper are – by
definition – externally stable, since the nations outside the treaty can freely decide to embrace or revoke the
pact at any point in time.
As the aim of the UN climate talks is to avert world temperature increase by more than 2 degrees Celsius, we
have also analysed a broader policy initiative which entails all the major economies of the World. According
to our results, it is possible to conquer this target with a partial environmental resolution that involves all
regions with the exception of SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa), MENA (Middle East and North Africa) and SASIA
(South Asian Countries) with admittance requirements ranging from 40% to 90% (MEF Scenarios). In such a
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context it is interesting to examine the decision choice of the oil exporting countries (MENA aggregate),
since a reduction of GHG emissions would imply also a shrink of oil extraction activities and then oil
revenues. Consequently there is a trade-off between oil revenues and carbon revenues. It is interesting to
note that flagging global oil demand – driven by the climate policy actions of the MEF regions – is also an
incentive for the exporting countries to scale down carbon-intensive oil extraction processes and get carbon
revenues by undertaking the agreement. Thus the gains associated with carbon trade activities are in these
scenarios more appealing for them as they will participate actively in the agreement.
The results of our study go in the direction of filling the gap between the observed fact that some countries
are undertaking some unilateral actions and theory which predicts that this not rational (as mentioned in
Kolstad 2011). Our work provides evidence that unilateral actions can be a viable solution if “open” to
engage other countries. In particular the decision of a single country can influence other’s decision, as the
climate initiative could spill across borders. A direct policy recommendation is to provide a better integration
of the carbon markets (the European Emission Trading Scheme, the Australian trading system) as well as
other instruments such CDM and Joint Implementation.
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Appendix 1
In this appendix we provide the equation governing endogenous participation implemented in the WITCH
model. The equations are different as we distinguish between signatory and non-signatory countries.
The first equation presented applies only for the endorser regions. Then equations A2 and A3 apply for both
the endorser and non-signatory nations. Finally equations A4-A7 apply only for non-signatory countries. The
time period is indexed by t, while the regions are indexed by n.

t

EMI ( t , n )  EMI _ TARGET ( t , n )  NIP( t , n )  SAV ( t , n )

A1)

Equation 1 sets exogenously a constraint on GHG releases and thus it applies only for the signatory
countries. Basically the amount of GHG emissions (EMI) should not exceed the amount of allocated permits
(EMI_TARGET11) plus Net Import of Permits in the carbon market (NIP) and by subtracting transfer of credit
offsets over time (SAV) as we allow for intertemporal flexibility through banking and borrowing. The
intertemporal flexibility option requires a a terminal condition in period T (equation A2), as each region have
to clear all the amount of savings eventually banked or borrowed from the future.
T

 SAV ( t ,n )  0

When: t  T

A2)

When: t  T

A3)

t tpl
T

T

t tpl

t tpl

 max0, NIP( t ,n )  ABS  TRP( t ,n )

Also equation A3 imposes a constraint in the final period: the amount of cumulative import of permit should
not exceed the amount of cumulative carbon permits tradable in the market – in absolute value – throughout
the century. TRP (Tradable Emission Permits) represents the difference between the level of domestic GHG
emissions (EMI) and the emission target (EMI_TARGET), and therefore it represents the trading potential of
each country (without considering banking and borrowing).
Now we introduce the equations applying only for the non-signatory countries, which can opt in any point in
time whether to sign-up or betray the environmental deal;

NIP( t ,n )  min 0, TRP( t ,n )  SAV ( t ,n )

t

A4)

SAV ( t ,n )  max 0,TRP( t ,n )  NIP( t ,n )

t

A5)

11

As far as the signatory countries are concerned, the parameter EMI_TARGET is set exogenously according to an
emission path which is consistent with a 450 ppm-e scenario at the global level (if all the countries are assumed to be
signatory). For the non-signatory countries the emission target amounts to the level of the BaU emission multiplied by
(1-e(t)), where e represents the admission requirement to participate in the Emission Trading Scheme.
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NIP( t ,n )   max 0,TRP( t ,n )

t and with   0

A6)

t 1

SAV ( t ,n )   SAV ( t ,n )  max( 1   )TRP( t ,n ),min 0,TRP( t ,n )

t

A7)

t tpl

Please note that in our simulations we assume

=2

We would like also to provide some additional explanations regarding the intertemporal flexibility (banking
and borrowing option), and the possibility for the non-signatory regions to refrain from the agreement at any
point in time. In such a context equation A7 imposes that: 1) if TRP is positive, the cumulative amount of
carbon offsets eventually banked to the future should be always inferior or equal to ( 1   )TRP( t ,n ) ; and
2) if TRP is negative the amount of cumulative savings must be lower or equal to zero. As a result, if a
region backslides on carbon intensive technology (TRP<0), has to clear the banking and borrowing position
(cumulative net of savings lower or equal to zero) before shrinking from the coalition. It should be noted that
this condition is not binding when TRP is positive and the cumulative amount of savings is equal to zero, as
it intersects equations 5 and 6 in a unique point.
In order to ease the comprehension of the model we provide a geometrical representation of the equations by
showing the feasible area of the problem:

Figure A1

Figure A2

Subjected to conditions:

Subjected to conditions:

1) TRP(t,n) <0;

TRP(t,n) >0;

2)

t 1

 SAV ( t ,n )  0

t  tpl

t 1

 SAV ( t ,n )  0

t  tpl

The graphs above reveal the area of feasibility (shaded) of the problem for the non-signatory countries,
which can choose endogenously to participate in the climate accord. We have omitted equations A2 and A3,
since they are binding only in the last period of the time horizon t=T.
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The horizontal axis represent the amount of NIP (Net import of permits), and the vertical axis corresponds to
the amount of SAV (carbon credit savings from banking and borrowing). The graph on the left characterize a
situation in which the non-signatory countries are not reducing GHG emission compared to their target (e).
In this condition they cannot buy permits (condition imposed by equation A6) and they can sell permits only
if they borrow (SAV <0) carbon credits from the future (they short sell carbon permits today by promising to
cut GHG emissions tomorrow). Another option is to not to sell permits and continue to emit GHG without
any constrain (this situation is represented by the origin of the axes, which is part of the feasible area since
all the equations are specified with the less or equal condition).
The panel on the right depicts a scenario in which the non-signatory countries are containing the emission
compared to their target (TRP >0). In this situation, they can choose whether to sell permits and not make use
of banking and borrowing (SAV=0) for a maximum amount equal to TRP, or to increase their selling today
by borrowing carbon credits from the future (SAV<0) or to save permits for the future (SAV>0). In principle
they can even choose to curb GHG emissions compared to their climate target and not to get involved in the
environmental agreement (origin of axes).
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Appendix 2
In this section we provide the estimates of the Abatement cost parameters for the analytical model. Since the
parameter h is common to the signatory and non-signatory countries, the system that has been estimated is
the following:

This can be rewritten as:
(
) ( )
(

) (

)

( ( ))

( ( )

)

(

)

( ( ))

( ( )

)

(

)

Where:
C(1) =

(

)

logarithm of percent of global cumulated abatement of non-signatory countries as a

whole
exponent of the Abatement Cost curve

C(2) =
C(3) =

(

)

logarithm of percent of global cumulated abatement of signatory country as a whole

= Net present value of the carbon tax ($\Gtco2)

It should be also noted that in the static model we assume that the two agents (signatory and non-signatory)
have the same size in terms of GHG emissions in the BaU scenario. This assumption implies that when the
non-signatory agent participates in, the global amount of emission is given by ( ̃

̅). Of course this

assumption does not hold in the WITCH model. Therefore, in order to estimate the parameters

,

and

we have translated the target of the signatory agent ̅, in the equivalent target in terms of percent of global
abatement, and then we have computed the optimal entry requirements ̅ in terms of % of global abatement.
Once we have calculated the optimal entry requirements (in terms of per cent of global abatement required to
participate), these values have been transformed in the equivalent regional level (percent of regional
abatement required to participate), and reported in table 3.
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OLS estimation:

System: EU_CASE
Estimation Method: Iterative Least Squares
Date: 01/16/13 Time: 11:32
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

11.15516
2.953913
5.264330

0.431614
0.114715
0.133516

25.84521
25.75006
39.42850

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.005334

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.960440
0.954789
0.315631
1.497384

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

4.483081
1.484418
0.697360

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.941237
0.932842
0.384686
0.451563
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Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

4.483081
1.484418
1.035881
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System: OECD
Estimation Method: Iterative Least Squares
Date: 01/16/13 Time: 11:34
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

8.110703
3.074756
5.840117

0.259627
0.119419
0.152194

31.23981
25.74756
38.37280

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.002633

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.964579
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.959519
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.298664
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
1.273206
Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.940738
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.932272
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.386315
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
0.610842
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4.483081
1.484418
0.624401

4.483081
1.484418
1.044675
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System: OECD_CHINA
Estimation Method: Iterative Least Squares
Date: 01/16/13 Time: 11:41
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

6.867374
3.148005
6.679153

0.200645
0.125240
0.191659

34.22654
25.13587
34.84914

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.000121

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.957943
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.951935
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.325439
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
0.864603
Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.945020
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.937166
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.372095
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
0.990688
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4.483081
1.484418
0.741372

4.483081
1.484418
0.969181
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System: MEF
Estimation Method: Iterative Least Squares
Date: 01/16/13 Time: 11:43
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

5.602679
3.060663
8.948590

0.156490
0.130082
0.332916

35.80205
23.52871
26.87945

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.002041

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.950811
0.943784
0.351953
0.631907

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

4.483081
1.484418
0.867099

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.936384
0.927296
0.400255
1.147064

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
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4.483081
1.484418
1.121427
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SUR estimation:

System: EU_CASE
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 03/04/13 Time: 12:15
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 4 total coef iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

10.66811
2.819467
5.182628

0.449117
0.121577
0.134540

23.75351
23.19070
38.52112

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.004062

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.966630
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.961863
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.289888
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
1.218955
Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.926043
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.915478
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.431561
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
0.264936
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4.483081
1.484418
0.588247

4.483081
1.484418
1.303711

38

Sferra and Tavoni: Endogenous Participation in a Partial Climate Agreement with

System: OECD
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 03/04/13 Time: 12:17
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 4 total coef iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

7.742537
2.886360
5.678129

0.252295
0.121708
0.153539

30.68839
23.71536
36.98172

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.001525

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.965484
0.960553
0.294824
0.757705

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

4.483081
1.484418
0.608448

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.924123
0.913283
0.437128
0.303857

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid
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4.483081
1.484418
1.337563
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System: OECD_CHINA
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 03/04/13 Time: 12:18
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 4 total coef iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

7.141173
3.352925
6.934997

0.181785
0.114871
0.181240

39.28362
29.18868
38.26424

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

5.35E-05

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.952292
0.945477
0.346614
1.270817

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

4.483081
1.484418
0.840988

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Prob(F-statistic)

0.933352
0.923831
0.409681
1.303324
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Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Sum squared resid

4.483081
1.484418
1.174868
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System: MEF
Estimation Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 03/04/13 Time: 12:19
Sample: 1 9
Included observations: 9
Total system (balanced) observations 18
Iterate coefficients after one-step weighting matrix
Convergence achieved after: 1 weight matrix, 3 total coef iterations

C(1)
C(2)
C(3)

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

5.633983
3.101765
9.046631

0.161918
0.163072
0.406722

34.79520
19.02085
22.24277

0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Determinant residual covariance

0.002010

Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(1))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_S)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.952527
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.945745
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.345760
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
0.729480
Equation: LOG(CTAX) = (C(3))+LOG(C(2))+(C(2)-1)*LOG(A_NS)
Observations: 9
R-squared
0.933917
Mean dependent var
Adjusted R-squared
0.924476
S.D. dependent var
S.E. of regression
0.407941
Sum squared resid
Prob(F-statistic)
1.216853
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4.483081
1.484418
0.836849

4.483081
1.484418
1.164913
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